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Can a City Declare that All Pickup Trucks 
Are Legally Ugly?  A Florida Case Tests the Limits 
of Aesthetic Regulation 
Scott Andron* 
INTRODUCTION 
The best-selling car in America isn’t a car at all; it’s a pickup truck.  In 
October 2012, for example, Ford sold more than 56,000 F-series pickups, or 
nearly twice as many units as the Toyota Camry, the top-selling passenger 
vehicle without an open cargo bed in the back.1 
America has a love affair with the pickup truck.  The City of Coral 
Gables, however, does not.  Rather, what this South Florida municipality 
had, up until recently, was an unusual ordinance that prohibits parking of 
pickup trucks on city streets between 7 p.m. and 7 a.m.2  Unlike most 
similar rules, this ordinance covered not only commercial vehicles marked 
with the name of a business, but also private trucks with no markings or 
special attachments.3  Also, pickups were prohibited not only on public 
streets but also in private driveways.4  The only place a pickup truck could 
be stored at night in the city was in a garage.5 
Lowell Kuvin didn’t have a garage, so he parked his F-150 in front of 
his Coral Gables home, and the city fined him $50.6  Kuvin sued the city in 
2003, challenging the constitutionality of the pick-up truck ban.  A panel of 
Florida’s Third District Court of Appeal overturned the regulation as 
applied to Kuvin’s pickup truck,7 but after an en banc rehearing, the full 
court upheld the city ordinance as rationally related to the city’s interest in 
maintaining an attractive community,8 and the state Supreme Court denied 
 
 *  J.D. Candidate, Florida International University, May 2014.  The writer also is a journalist and 
has written extensively about land-use issues for newspapers in Florida, North Carolina and 
Pennsylvania. 
 1 Auto Sales, WALL ST. J., http://online.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/2_3022-autosales.html (last 
visited Nov. 1, 2012). 
2 CORAL GABLES, FLA., ZONING CODE §§ 8-11 and 8-12 (2003).  Later renumbered to §§ 4-411 
and 4-412. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at §§ 8-11. 
5 Id. 
6 Idy Fernandez, Truck Owners Riled Over Ban, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 16, 2003, at 1E. 
7 Kuvin v. City of Coral Gables, 62 So. 3d 604, 608 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). 
8 Kuvin v. City of Coral Gables, 62 So. 3d 625, 640 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). 
28 ANDRON_PUBLISHER2 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/13/2014  8:28 PM 
84 FIU Law Review [Vol. 9:83 
certiorari.9 
The Kuvin case illustrates the extreme breadth of the municipal power 
to regulate aesthetics.  In most cases, municipal appearance rules are subject 
only to rational-basis review, “the most relaxed and tolerant form of judicial 
scrutiny” in equal protection claims.10  Unless fundamental rights or suspect 
classes are implicated,11 the only limitation is that the regulation’s 
connection to a legitimate governmental purpose must not be “so attenuated 
as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.”12  But courts seldom 
strike down aesthetic regulations on this basis.13 
The Kuvin case also illustrates an interesting tension between two 
competing policy considerations: the perceived right to be free, especially 
in one’s own home, from gratuitous government meddling in private 
lifestyle or economic choices, against the right of communities to choose 
elected officials who can respond as they see fit to their constituents’ 
wishes without gratuitous meddling from judges.14 
These policy concerns divide not only judges, but also the Coral 
Gables community.  In a November 2012 referendum, the ordinance was 
repealed by a vote of 57 to 43%.15  Under the new rule, pickups are allowed 
provided they have no commercial markings or attachments and the beds 
are empty.16 
This paper will review the history of local aesthetic regulations with an 
emphasis on Florida, before analyzing the competing views of the judges in 
 
9 Kuvin v. City of Coral Gables, 64 So. 3d 118 (Fla. 2011). 
10 City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 20 (1989). 
11 See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 58-59 (1994) (holding that a ban on most signs 
in residential neighborhoods violates the First Amendment despite substantial state interest in 
aesthetics); Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564-65 (2000) (holding that a city must treat 
similarly situated landowners similarly to avoid an equal protection claim).  Also, a regulation must 
comply with Fifth Amendment limitations to avoid becoming a regulatory taking.  For example, a 
regulation may not be so burdensome as to deprive a landowner of all economically beneficial use of his 
land. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992) (holding that a regulation may not be 
so burdensome as to deprive a landowner of all economically beneficial use of his land.). 
12 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985). 
13 This point will be discussed throughout this paper, but illustrative cases include: Joel v. City of 
Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353, 1358 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that ordinance prohibiting homeless people 
from sleeping outdoors is rationally related to aesthetics); Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 922 
(11th Cir. 1995) (finding ban on houseboats in some areas of city is rationally related to aesthetics). 
14 As the trial judge put it: “This case involves the difficult task of balancing two competing 
interests: on the one hand, a community’s right to enact ordinances which promote and protect aesthetic 
considerations, and on the other hand, a citizen’s right to enjoy his property in the manner in which he or 
she desires to.”  Order on Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, Kuvin v. City of Coral Gables, No. 03-
08911-CA-24 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 14, 2005) (No. 23971-1588). 
15 Howard Cohen, It’s Official: Pickup Trucks are Legal in Coral Gables at Night, MIAMI 
HERALD (Nov. 9, 2012), http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/11/09/3089815_its-official-pickup-trucks-
are.html. 
16 Id. 
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Kuvin and considering other analyses they might have used.  Based on the 
facts and arguments before them, the judges had little option but to uphold 
the Coral Gables ordinance, but this paper will argue that plaintiff Kuvin 
missed or failed to develop some strong arguments that might have changed 
the outcome.  In the alternative, this paper will discuss changes in law that 
might limit state power over aesthetics. 
Throughout this paper, a theme will appear repeatedly because it lies at 
the heart of the Kuvin case and rational-basis cases generally: Legislatures 
aren’t precluded from passing silly laws, only irrational ones.  And when 
reasonable people can disagree about whether a law is crazy, it isn’t. 
The question is whether there was any way for Lowell Kuvin to get 
around this principle – and, if not, whether there should have been. 
LAND USE AND AESTHETICS UNDER THE POLICE POWER 
A wide range of municipal zoning and land-use regulations have been 
upheld based on their rational relationship to a substantial government 
interest in aesthetics.  This power over aesthetics may be seen as a specific 
case of the general holding of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,17 that 
exclusion of some uses of land via zoning is a valid exercise of the police 
power.  The Euclid Court prescribed what amounts to a rational-basis test to 
determine the validity of a land-use regulation: “If the validity of the 
legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the 
legislative judgment must be allowed to control.”18 
This principle was expressly extended to aesthetics in Berman v. 
Parker,19 which found that zoning for aesthetic purposes is a valid exercise 
of the police power.  In an oft-cited passage of the opinion, Justice Douglas 
wrote: 
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive.  . . . The 
values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as 
monetary.  It is within the power of the legislature to determine that 
the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well 
as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.  In the present 
case, the Congress and its authorized agencies have made 
determinations that take into account a wide variety of values. It is not 
for us to reappraise them. If those who govern the District of Columbia 
decide that the Nation’s Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, 
there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.20 
 
17 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
18 Id. at 388 (emphasis added). 
19 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
20 Id. at 33. 
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Allowing aesthetic regulations under the police power marked a major 
shift in the law.  For example, just two decades before Berman, a New 
Jersey appeals court struck down a limitation on billboards, declaring that 
“[a]esthetic considerations are a matter of luxury and indulgence rather than 
of necessity, and it is necessity alone which justifies the exercise of the 
police power to take private property without compensation.”21  Later 
decisions began to allow aesthetics-based regulations provided that another 
public purpose was also served, but the modern rule in most states is that 
aesthetics alone are a sufficient basis for land-use regulation.22 
Since Berman, numerous other types of aesthetic regulations have 
been upheld.  Some examples include architectural regulations,23 billboard 
bans,24 historic regulations,25 and restrictions on vehicles.26 
Acceptance of regulations based purely on aesthetics has not been 
consistent across states, however.  Berman acknowledged a state power to 
regulate for aesthetic purposes, but states have sometimes chosen to place 
their own limitations on this power.27  For example, some states have 
imposed a balancing test, requiring courts to weigh the regulation’s benefits 
to the public against the harm to the property owner.28  Other states stick to 
the old rule, that aesthetics alone are insufficient to justify use of the police 
power.29  But in most jurisdictions, aesthetics alone are sufficient to support 
 
21 City of Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting, Adver. & Sign Painting Co., 62 A. 267, 268 (N.J. 
1905) (cited in 2 ARDEN H. RATHKOPF ET AL., RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 16:3 
(4th ed. 2012)). 
22 2 ARDEN H. RATHKOPF ET AL., RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 16:4 (4th 
ed. 2012). 
23 E.g., Reid v. Architectural Bd. of Review of Cleveland Heights, 192 N.E.2d 74 (Ohio 1963) 
(upholding decision of municipal board of architects, who rejected plaintiff’s proposed modern-style 
concrete-and-glass home in a neighborhood full of colonials). 
24 E.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (plurality opinion) (holding 
that a municipality may ban billboards on aesthetic grounds, provided that it does not allow so many 
exceptions as to eviscerate the ban’s content-neutrality); City of Lake Wales v. Lamar Adver. Ass’n of 
Lakeland, 414 So. 2d 1030, 1032 (Fla. 1982) (“Cities have the authority to take steps to minimize sight 
pollution . . . .”). 
25 E.g., City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 389 P.2d 13, 18 (N.M. 1964) (upholding city 
regulation of the size of window panes to conform with ‘Old Santa Fe Style’ of architecture in historic 
district). 
26 5 ARDEN H. RATHKOPF ET AL., RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 83:37 
(4th ed. 2012).  Many specific cases are discussed in this paper, infra. 
27  For a more complete discussion of this point, see id. at § 16:6 (4th ed. 2012). 
28 E.g., State v. Jones, 290 S.E.2d 675, 681 (N.C. 1982); Chusud Realty Corp. v. Vill. of 
Kensington, 243 N.Y.S.2d 149, 155 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (“On balance, the court deems this a case ‘in which 
the legislative body goes too far in the name of aesthetics.’”) aff’d, 255 N.Y.S.2d 411 (App. Div. 1964). 
29 E.g., Heck v. Z.H.B. for Harveys Lake Boro., 397 A.2d 15, 19 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979) 
(“[a]esthetics alone cannot support a determination that the general welfare of a community would be 
adversely affected by the granting of a special exception.”). 
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land-use regulations.30 
Florida was an early adopter of land-use regulation as permitted by 
Euclid, and the state’s courts actually recognized aesthetics as a legitimate 
government interest before Berman.  In City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & 
Inland Co., the Florida Supreme Court noted Euclid’s “fairly debatable” 
standard, and upheld land-use restrictions in a city zoning ordinance based 
on aesthetics, at least for a beachfront community with a tourism-based 
economy.31  Later cases extended the rule to other beachfront cities,32 but by 
the early 1980s, the state’s courts were no longer stating any such 
limitation.33 
In Florida, Coral Gables is known for its strict land-use regulations.  
The community’s nickname is “The City Beautiful,” and its website is 
citybeautiful.net.  Humor writer Dave Barry lives in Coral Gables and once 
described it as “a grit-free community that keeps property values up by 
making pretty much everything illegal.  You get fined for painting your 
house a non-approved color; if you left a tire in your yard, you’d get the 
death penalty.”34 The city has a number of reported land-use cases to its 
credit, including Gold Coast Publications, Inc. v. Corrigan,35 in which the 
Eleventh Circuit upheld a complex set of regulations governing the size, 
shape, color, placement and other features permitted on newspaper racks 
within the city limits.  Back in the 1970s, the city also successfully 
defended a rule prohibiting the parking of trailers in residential 
neighborhoods.36 
Land-use regulations commonly include limitations or outright bans on 
storage of certain types of vehicles in residential districts.  Typically, 
 
30 2 ARDEN H. RATHKOPF ET AL., RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 16:5 (4th 
ed.) (includes list of states with cases adopting this rule). 
31 City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., 3 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 1941).  The court reaffirmed 
the principle in City of Miami Beach v. First Trust Co., 45 So. 2d 681, 684 (Fla. 1949) (“[T]he peculiar 
characteristics and qualities of the City of Miami Beach justify zoning to perpetuate its aesthetic appeal, 
and that this is an exercise of the police power in the protection of public welfare.”). 
32 E.g., Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 122 So. 2d 611, 615 (Fla. 1960) (“We agree that the City 
of Sarasota is reasonably placed in the same category as Miami Beach so far as its appeal on the ground 
of attractiveness is concerned.”); Rotenberg v. City of Fort Pierce, 202 So. 2d 782, 786 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1967) (upholding zoning rule against junkyard because the “City of Fort Pierce is no less an 
attraction to tourists for its aesthetic qualities than the cities of Miami Beach and Sarasota”). 
33 Campbell v. Monroe Cnty., 426 So. 2d 1158, 1160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (“We agree that a 
Florida county may enforce zoning requirements which primarily regulate aesthetic appearances.”); City 
of Lake Wales v. Lamar Adver. Ass’n of Lakeland, 414 So. 2d 1030, 1031 (Fla. 1982) (holding that 
“aesthetics alone” are sufficient justification for billboard regulations). 
34 Dave Barry, Did Somebody Smell a Rat?, MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 13, 2011), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/2011/02/12/2062066/dave-barry-did-somebody-smell.html. 
35 Gold Coast Publications, Inc. v. Corrigan, 42 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 516 
U.S. 931 (1995). 
36 City of Coral Gables v. Wood, 305 So. 2d 261 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974). 
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prohibited vehicles include vehicles that cannot move under their own 
power, trailers, recreational vehicles, boats, vehicles with more than two 
axles, and commercial vehicles, which are typically defined as those 
marked with a company name and other lettering, or those with special 
attachments such as tow trucks.37  Such regulations are generally upheld.38 
But few reported cases specifically address pickup trucks.  In Kuvin, 
the trial court relied on Coral Gables v. Wood, which dealt with campers, 
but was binding authority in the Miami area’s state appellate court district.39  
Nevertheless, the trial court noted that judges elsewhere had reached 
different conclusions.40  For example, in Proctor v. City of Coral Springs,41 
an appellate court in a neighboring district found that a law prohibiting 
parking of trucks on residential property was 
[u]nreasonable and unconstitutional as applied to pickup trucks.  It 
restricts drivers of pickup trucks from visiting with friends or family 
by making it illegal to be parked in a residential driveway, or on the 
hosts’ lawn, or in the street in front of the home after 9:00 p.m. even 
though the vehicle in question is not truly a commercial vehicle; i.e., 
without commercial markings of any nature and not used for 
commercial purposes.42 
The court’s rationale was somewhat confusing.  On the one hand, the 
 
37 An example of a relatively permissive ordinance is Section 33-124.1 of the Miami-Dade 
County Code of Ordinances, which allows homeowners to park up to two taxicabs, limousines, or 
commercially marked vehicles in a residential neighborhood without restriction.  One of these vehicles 
may be a truck equipped with ladders or other equipment, provided that it is concealed behind an opaque 
fence, in a garage, or behind the house.  An example of a more restrictive ordinance is Section 25-43 of 
the City of Plantation, Fla., Code of Ordinances, which requires that all taxicabs, limousines, 
commercially marked vehicles, tow trucks and the like be concealed in a garage or carport.  Pickup 
trucks are allowed, but if any property is stored in the bed, that property must not be visible from the 
street. 
38 E.g., Township of Livingston v. Marchev, 205 A.2d 65 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1964) (camp 
trailers); Village of Glenview v. Van Dyke, 240 N.E.2d 354 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (camp trailers); Disney 
v. City of Concord, 194 Cal. App.  4th 1410 (Ct. App. 2011) (recreational vehicles); Whaley v. 
Dorchester Cnty. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 524 S.E.2d 404, 408 (S.C. 1999) (commercial vehicles, 
defined as those exceeding five tons in weight or eight feet in height, or having more than two axles); 
People v. Tolman, 168 Cal. Rptr. 328 (App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1980) (commercial vehicles exceeding 
three tons); Recreational Vehicle United Citizens Ass’n v. City of Sterling Heights, 418 N.W.2d 702 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (campers, boats, snowmobiles, and trailers).  For a detailed discussion of such 
regulations, see 5 ARDEN H. RATHKOPF ET AL., RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 
83:37 (4th ed. 2012). 
39 Order on Cross Motion for Summary Judgment at 6-7, Kuvin v. City of Coral Gables, No. 03-
08911-CA-24 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 14, 2005) (No. 23971-1588). 
40 Id. 
41 Coral Springs is a suburban community about 40 miles north of Miami but in a different 
appellate district.  Florida also has a third city with the word “coral” in its name, but fortunately, Cape 
Coral does not come into this story. 
42 396 So. 2d 771, 772 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). 
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court suggested that the ordinance was unreasonable because of its effect on 
residents’ ability to receive visitors or to park a non-commercial truck in 
front of the house.  But on the other hand, the court also distinguished the 
case from Wood, because, unlike in Wood, the Coral Springs ordinance 
failed to allow owners to park their vehicles even in an enclosed garage.  
This led the trial court in Kuvin to believe that Proctor was inapt.43  So 
Proctor could be read as holding that the Coral Springs law was 
unreasonable either because it lacked a garage exception, or because it 
failed to distinguish commercial from non-commercial pickup trucks, and 
perhaps infringed on freedom of association. 
In a concurring opinion in Proctor, Judge Daniel T.K. Hurley 
expressly stated that he saw the ordinance as violating the right to 
association under the federal and state constitutions.44  Judge Hurley noted 
that Proctor’s truck had been ticketed while it was parked at the homes of 
his friends and his mother-in-law.45  Judge Hurley also suggested that the 
ordinance might raise privacy issues under the state and federal 
constitutions because of the special protection that applies to the home.46  
He said that the ordinance should be subject to strict scrutiny pursuant to 
NAACP v. Alabama.47 
In a dissenting opinion in Proctor, Judge John H. Moore II disagreed 
with the majority’s opinion that the ordinance was unreasonable.48  Judge 
Moore also said that he “fail[ed] to see how a violation of this relatively 
clear and simple parking ordinance rises to the level of such constitutional 
proportions as suggested by Judge Hurley.”49  Finally, Judge Moore 
chastised the court for substituting its judgment for that of Coral Springs’ 
leaders absent a clear constitutional violation.50 
In City of Nichols Hills v. Richardson,51 an Oklahoma appellate court 
overturned a municipal ordinance prohibiting the overnight parking of 
pickup trucks in residential neighborhoods.  The court recognized the 
 
43 Order on Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 39, at 6. 
44 Proctor, 396 So. 2d at 772-73 (Hurley, J., concurring) (“It is immaterial whether the beliefs 
sought to be advanced by association pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural matters . . . .”) 
(citing NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)). 
45 Proctor, 396 So. 2d at 773. 
46 Id. (stating that the U.S. Supreme Court had “declared the privacy of the homeplace to be 
virtually sacrosanct” in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), and that Florida courts have held that 
the right of privacy “includes the right to be free from unreasonable restrictions on the use of the 
residence,” citing Foss v. Foss, 392 So. 2d 606, 607 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)). 
47 Proctor, 396 So. 2d 774. 
48 Id. (Moore, J., dissenting). 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 City of Nichols Hills v. Richardson, 939 P.2d 17 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997). 
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legitimate governmental interest in aesthetics, but found the ordinance both 
over- and under-inclusive.52  The court, after citing Proctor as agreeing, 
wrote: 
Any vehicle that meets the definition of a “private passenger vehicle,” 
no matter how ugly, rusted or offensive, may be parked in this 
municipality between the hours of 2:00 a.m. and 5:00 a.m.  However, 
not a single pickup, no matter how new, expensive, or “pleasing to the 
eye,” may be parked in any driveway during these hours.53 
Another pickup case was Minx v. Village of Flossmoor,54 in which the 
plaintiff truck owner claimed an equal protection violation because the 
defendant municipality prohibited him from parking his non-commercial 
pick-up truck in his driveway, but allowed passenger cars.  The court 
rejected the village’s motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6), finding that the plaintiff had stated a valid claim.55  
While noting that equal-protection challenges to zoning rules seldom 
succeed,56 the court, in a facetious footnote, pointed to a number of logical 
problems raised by the village’s ordinance: 
While not pertinent to the present motion, the court wonders how pick-
up owners in Flossmoor will fix flat tires.  The court also is curious as 
to how Flossmoor’s pick-up owners will wash their trucks without 
flooding their garages.  They supposedly could have someone drive 
their vehicles back and forth on their driveways or in front of their 
house, so as not to have the vehicle parked, while stationary persons 
wash the truck.57 
That brings us to Kuvin.  After losing in the trial court, Kuvin sought 
review in Florida’s Third District Court of Appeal, and a divided three-
judge panel found the Coral Gables ordinance unconstitutional as applied to 
the plaintiff’s truck.58  Applying rational-basis scrutiny,59 the majority 
found that the ordinance was not rationally related to either of two possible 
governmental purposes.60  The ordinance wasn’t rationally related to 
keeping commercial vehicles out of a residential neighborhood because 
 
52 Id. at 19. 
53 Id. 
54 Minx v. Vill. of Flossmoor, 724 F. Supp. 592 (N.D. Ill. 1989). 
55 Id. at 594-95. 
56 Id. at 594. 
57 Id. at n.2. 
58 Kuvin v. City of Coral Gables, 62 So. 3d 604, 604-05 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). 
59 Id. at 605. 
60 Id. at 605-06. 
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Kuvin’s truck was not commercial.61  And the ordinance was not rationally 
related to aesthetics for the same reasons cited in City of Nichols Hills: the 
ordinance allows ugly cars but not attractive trucks.62  Writing for the court, 
Senior Judge Alan R. Schwartz said “there is nothing to distinguish Kuvin’s 
truck or others like it from what some might think are even more 
aesthetically displeasing cars or, even more plainly, from one of whatever 
make or model which is in obvious disrepair or just plain dirty.”63 
Judge Schwartz distinguished Kuvin from Wood in that different types 
of vehicles were involved, and in that plaintiff Kuvin had no garage in 
which to conceal his vehicle, unlike plaintiff Wood.64 
Judge Schwartz also raised some privacy and associational issues 
similar to those in Judge Hurley’s concurring opinion in Proctor.65  Because 
the city’s aesthetic rationale was implausible, Judge Schwartz reasoned, the 
city must be targeting pickup drivers for some reason related to their tastes 
or lifestyle.66  The city “require[d] Kuvin to choose between owning and 
parking a personal vehicle of his choice in Coral Gables and leaving town 
(which is what Kuvin, taking his cursed truck with him, actually did).  That 
is a decision that no government may require.”67  Judge Schwartz cited no 
case or legal proposition for this statement.  Then he went further, 
declaring: “[T]here is a larger issue at stake here.  Absent any legitimate 
basis for the ordinances, what remains is that the City Parents disapprove of 
a perhaps unorthodox vehicle and the possibly diverse taste and lifestyle 
which may be reflected by its ownership.”68  Citing Judge Hurley’s opinion 
in Proctor and a U.S. Supreme Court case striking down a municipal 
attempt to define “family,”69 Judge Schwartz wrote: 
For a governmental decision to be based on such considerations is 
more than wrong; it is frightening.  Perhaps Coral Gables can require 
that all its houses be made of ticky-tacky and that they all look just the 
same, but it cannot mandate that its people are, or do.  Our nation and 
way of life are based on a treasured diversity, but Coral Gables 
punishes it.  Such an action may not be upheld.70 
As in Proctor before it, the Kuvin panel opinion included three 
 
61 Id. at 606. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 608. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
70 Kuvin, 62 So. 3d at 608. 
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separate opinions from as many judges. 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Angel A. Cortiñas added that he saw a 
clear distinction between “commercial and/recreational vehicles,” on the 
one hand, and “personal use mainstream vehicles” on the other.71  The 
former could rationally be kept out of residential neighborhoods, while the 
latter could not.72  “Like Judge Schwartz, I find this distinction to be 
frightening,” Cortiñas wrote.  “It would allow government to regulate the 
types of personal use vehicles its citizens drive simply based on their 
outward appearance.  Such a holding embraces George Orwell’s dystopia, 
where personal rights are subverted by the government.”73 
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Leslie B. Rothenberg suggested her 
colleagues get back to basics.  Citing cases like Euclid and Ocean & Inland 
Co., Judge Rothenberg pointed out that a zoning ordinance is subject only 
to rational-basis scrutiny and “must be upheld if reasonable persons could 
differ as to its propriety.”74  Judge Rothenberg also noted that Florida 
allows zoning regulations supported solely on aesthetic grounds.75  Bound 
by these precedents, Judge Rothenberg argued, the court was obliged to 
defer to Coral Gables and uphold the ordinance.76 
Despite this call for deference to legislators, however, Judge 
Rothenberg went further and reached the affirmative conclusion that “open-
bed pickup trucks parked in residential neighborhoods at night detract from 
their residential character”77 because pickups are designed for commercial 
use.78  Explaining the connection between aesthetics and pickup trucks, 
Judge Rothenberg wrote: 
These ordinances make perfect sense and are rationally related to 
maintaining and enhancing the residential character of the City’s 
neighborhoods and the aesthetics of the City because any vehicle that 
was designed for commercial use, regardless of whether it is used for 
commercial purposes, looks the same and is likely to be used to store 
and carry bulk material exposed to public view.79 
While acknowledging that the majority applied rational basis, albeit 
reaching the wrong result, Judge Rothenberg also considered and rejected 
 
71 Id. at 609 (Cortiñas, J., concurring). 
72 Id. at 611 (citing City of Nichols Hills v. Richardson, 939 P.2d 17 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997), 
and Proctor v. City of Coral Springs, 396 So. 2d 771 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)). 
73 Kuvin, 62 So. 3d at 611. 
74 Id. at 613 (Rothenberg, J., dissenting). 
75 Id. at 614-15. 
76 Id. at 615. 
77 Id. at 615. 
78 Id. at 617. 
79 Id. at 616. 
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Kuvin’s argument that the ordinance infringes on his fundamental right to 
freedom of association, and therefore, that strict scrutiny should apply.80  
Relying on cases such as Roberts v. U.S. Jaycess,81 Judge Rothenberg 
delineated two types of freedom of association: intimate relationships and 
expressive association.82  “Intimate relationships” refers to “marriage, the 
begetting and bearing of children, child rearing and education, and 
cohabitation with relatives.”83  Kuvin’s claim that the city ordinance 
prevented him from visiting close friends in the city after 7:00 p.m. in his 
truck would not prove an infringement of an intimate relationship because 
close friendships are not intimate relationships akin to marriage and 
parenthood, Judge Rothenberg argued.84  As for expressive association, 
Judge Rothenberg pointed to cases where it has been held to include 
“service activities, transmitting values like the Boy Scouts of America . . . 
and ‘civic, charitable, lobbying, fundraising, and other activities.’”85  
Kuvin’s social meetings with friends are not analogous to these cases 
because they lack a real expressive element, Judge Rothenberg said.86  
Moreover, the city’s ordinance did not impede these meetings because it did 
not stop him from owning a truck; it merely required him to keep it 
garaged.87 
The city asked for a rehearing en banc, which was granted.88  The en 
banc court reversed the panel decision by a vote of 6-2.89  A modified 
version of Judge Rothenberg’s panel dissent became the opinion of the 
court.  Judge Frank A. Shepherd issued a concurring opinion,90 while Judge 
Cortiñas issued a dissenting opinion, joined by Judge Vance E. Salter.91 
In his concurring opinion, Judge Shepherd chides both the majority 
and the dissent for substituting their respective judgments for those of the 
Coral Gables City Commission.92  He wrote: “I am more concerned by the 
enthusiasm with which the majority embraces these ordinances.  I do not 
 
80 Id. at 621-24. 
81 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
82 Kuvin, 62 So. 3d at 622-24 (Rothenberg, J., dissenting). 
83 Id. at 622. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 623 (internal citations omitted). 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 623-24. 
88 Kuvin v. City of Coral Gables, 62 So. 3d 625 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 641-42. 
91 Id. at 642-48.  Note that Judge Schwartz did not participate in the en banc rehearing because he 
was a senior judge. 
92 Id. at 641 (“It is up to the Coral Gables City Commission to decide whether to make any 
change in their ordinances.”). 
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believe the ordinances ‘make perfect sense.’  In fact, it is not our place to so 
decide.  Aesthetic judgments necessarily are subjective in nature, defying 
objective evaluation.”93  He concluded: 
If I were a member of the Coral Gables City Commission, I might 
argue it is improvident to maintain the ordinances before us on the 
City’s books. As a member of this Court, I am not privileged to do so.  
However, under our system of government, it is our expectation as 
citizens that improvident decisions of local government, as 
distinguished from unlawful decisions, “will eventually be rectified by 
the democratic process and that judicial intervention is generally 
unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political branch 
has acted.”  This is as it should be.94 
In his dissent, Judge Cortiñas recaps his and Judge Schwartz’s 
arguments from their majority opinion in the panel decision.95 
The Kuvin case reached its conclusion when the Florida Supreme 
Court refused to hear Kuvin’s appeal.96 
ANALYSIS 
Kuvin was a difficult case.  It presented a situation in which the 
government was intruding into an unusual sphere of everyday life.  While 
most people would not be surprised to learn of a local regulation prohibiting 
the parking of a camper or a box truck in a private driveway, a rule against 
an empty and unmarked pickup truck isn’t common.  On the other hand, 
what right did the law interfere with?  In the pickup cases discussed above, 
most judges did not see a fundamental right to free association being 
implicated.  Plainly, Kuvin’s use of his property – both his land and his 
truck – was affected by the ordinance.  But for substantive97 due-process 
purposes, property rights are not fundamental and therefore may be 
infringed without triggering elevated scrutiny.98 
As suggested by cases like Euclid, the U.S. Supreme Court has given 
legislative bodies wide leeway to limit the use of private property without 
effecting a taking.  Justice Holmes explained the rationale ninety years ago 
 
93 Id. at 642 (internal citation omitted). 
94 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
95 Id. at 642-48. 
96 Kuvin v. City of Coral Gables, 64 So. 3d 118 (Fla. 2011). 
97 Infringement of property rights do, of course, trigger procedural due process, ensuring the 
property owner gets notice and a hearing before the government infringes them.  E.g., Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976).  Procedural due process is not at issue here. 
98 See, e.g., 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONST. L. § 15.4(e) (5th 
ed. 2012) (“[A] majority of Justices continue to use the rational basis test to approve laws . . . restricting 
the use of property.”). 
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in this famous passage from Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon: 
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to 
property could not be diminished without paying for every such 
change in the general law.  As long recognized some values are 
enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police 
power.  But obviously the implied limitation must have its limits or the 
contract and due process clauses are gone.  One fact for consideration 
in determining such limits is the extent of the diminution.  When it 
reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an 
exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act.  So 
the question depends upon the particular facts.  The greatest weight is 
given to the judgment of the legislature but it always is open to 
interested parties to contend that the legislature has gone beyond its 
constitutional power.99 
Kuvin never argued that the city was effecting a regulatory taking.  
Neither his house nor his truck were taken, and he did not argue that the 
city’s action substantially diminished their value. 
This brings us back to substantive due process.  With no fundamental 
right at issue, Kuvin’s only protection was rational-basis scrutiny.  And, as 
Judge Rothenberg notes, rational basis “is the most relaxed and tolerant 
form of judicial scrutiny.”100  Since we already know that the state has a 
legitimate interest in aesthetics, Kuvin’s only hope was that a court would 
find that the relationship between aesthetics and the blanket ban on pickups 
was “so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.”101  
And, just as he hoped, the panel majority found the ordinance both over- 
and under-inclusive. 
Here we encounter a problem with the U.S. Supreme Court’s rational-
basis jurisprudence: it’s not entirely clear when courts are supposed to 
examine the fit of a regulation to determine whether it is over- or under-
inclusive.102  Some commentators believe that fit is irrelevant to rational-
basis analysis.103  But, the Supreme Court has expressly considered fit while 
 
99 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). 
100 Kuvin, 62 So. 3d at 632 (citing City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 26 (1989)). 
101 City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985). 
102 See, e.g., 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONST. L. § 18.3(b) (5th 
ed.) (“The rationality test is easy to state: the classification only has to have a rational relationship to any 
legitimate governmental interest in order to comply with the equal protection guarantee. However, the 
meaning of that test is not clear.”). 
103 E.g., Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Claims in the Supreme Court from the 1971 
Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 374 (1999) (stating that “overinclusion and 
underinclusion” are “usually thought to be without significance under traditional rational basis 
deference”); Kenneth W. Simons, Overinclusion and Underinclusion: A New Model, 36 UCLA L. REV. 
447, 478 (1989) (“Under the rational basis test, probably no amount of overinclusion or underinclusion 
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applying rational basis in some cases, such as in Cleburne and U.S. 
Department of Agriculture v. Moreno.104  Many commentators, attempting 
to reconcile these cases with others involving rational-basis scrutiny, 
concluded that Cleburne and their ilk actually involved a different test.105 
Interestingly, it’s not clear that the majority in the en banc Kuvin 
decision considered fit irrelevant.  Judge Rothenberg went beyond merely 
saying that she didn’t think Kuvin had proved the Coral Gables ordinance 
irrational, and therefore that the court must defer to the City Commission.  
She went further, holding that the ordinance was indeed rational. 
But if fit is not the measure of an ordinance’s “rational relationship” to 
a legitimate governmental purpose, what is?  Is there any way the pickup 
truck ordinance could have been struck down under a rational-basis 
analysis?  And if not, is there some other rule that should apply to aesthetic 
regulations? 
The following sections will examine theories under which ordinances 
like the one in Kuvin could be struck down.  The first two theories, under 
the heading of “Roads Not Taken,” are arguments available under current 
law, but that Kuvin did not fully develop or failed to use at all.  The 
remaining theories, under the heading of “Removing Roadblocks,” would 
require legislative or judicial action to implement. 
ROADS NOT TAKEN 
Based on the facts and legal issues presented, it’s no surprise that the 
en banc court rejected Kuvin’s appeal.  After all, as Judge Rothenberg 
pointed out, if reasonable people can disagree about whether an ordinance is 
irrational, it isn’t.  This point seems to dispose of the case by effectively 
taking further analysis out of the court’s jurisdiction. 
But, as in almost every area of law, the rational-basis rules have 
exceptions.  Unfortunately for Lowell Kuvin, his briefs only hinted at, or 
missed altogether, some of the strongest arguments available to him. 
That’s not to say he necessarily would have won had he offered these 
arguments.  After all, the en banc vote was 6-2.  And the arguments 
discussed below may still strike many judges as too weak to overcome the 
heavy burden needed to strike down a law under rational basis. 
But one has to imagine that at least some of the judges in this case 
were scratching their heads, as much as any lay observer, in trying to figure 
 
is too much.”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 56, 
79 (1997) (“[J]udicial scrutiny under rational basis review is typically so deferential as to amount to a 
virtual rubber stamp.”). 
104 413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
105 E.g., Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other 
Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 795 (1987). 
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out how Coral Gables could effectively tell Lowell Kuvin that he couldn’t 
drive the nation’s most popular vehicle.  At least some of these judges had 
to be looking for an argument to overturn the ordinance, at least as applied 
to Kuvin, that would not get reversed by the Florida Supreme Court.  Kuvin 
didn’t give them that argument. 
But that doesn’t stop a Monday-morning quarterback.  Here are some 
possibilities. 
1. Ordinances Based on Irrational Animus Fail on Rational Basis 
The Coral Gables truck ordinance dates to 1960,106 and several facts 
have been cited to support the theory that the original purpose of the 
ordinance was not aesthetics but the exclusion of working-class people 
from the city.  While the modern pickup truck is a common substitute for a 
personal car, the pickup of the 1950s and 60s was a work vehicle.  
Moreover, Coral Gables represents the ordinance as grounded in aesthetics, 
but applies the law only at night, when the vehicles in question would be 
difficult to see. 
Or, as resident Larry Horton told the city’s Zoning Board at a public 
hearing: 
This is ridiculous.  If it’s for aesthetics, you’d have to regulate it 
during the day.  Now, my personal feeling is that really, this is not 
about pickup trucks.  This is an attempt to keep working class people 
who own pickup trucks from purchasing and living in the City of Coral 
Gables. . . .107 
This was a common refrain from critics of the ordinance.  For example, Joel 
Hollander, a University of Miami art history professor, told the Miami 
Herald on election day: “It just seems like a class issue.  When it was 
enacted decades ago, it was to keep the lower class out of Coral Gables.”108 
Finally, the ordinance was contemporaneous with a number of other 
laws with similar animus.  For example, the 1967 edition of the Coral 
Gables City Code included a provision authorizing the officials to prevent 
“undesirable persons,” such as paupers, from entering or remaining in the 
city.109  The same code also mandated racial segregation of 
neighborhoods.110  According to University of Miami law Professor 
 
106 Transcript of Coral Gables Zoning Board Meeting at 11 (Oct. 12, 2011), available at 
http://www.coralgables.com/modules/showdocument.aspx?documentid=9012. 
107 Id. at 27. 
108 Howard Cohen, 50-Year-Old Ban on Pickups Likely Scrapped, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 7, 2012, 
at 4B. 
109 CORAL GABLES, FLA. CITY CODE, § 8 (1967). 
110 Id. 
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Anthony Alfieri and others, Coral Gables operated an incinerator called 
“Old Smokey” in a black neighborhood just outside the city during the 
1960s, until the incinerator was closed as a public nuisance.111  The city 
apparently also had laws prohibiting black people from being in the city 
after dark without permission, according to Professor Alfieri.112 
In fact, Judges Hurley and Schwartz hinted that Coral Gables and 
Coral Springs might have had unspoken, nefarious motives for banning 
pickup trucks in their respective cities.  Judge Hurley’s remark about 
elitism seems to imply an animus against people who are not wealthy.  And 
indeed, Coral Gables is a wealthy city.  The median home in Coral Gables 
was worth $388,290 in 2012, more than triple the countywide average of 
$122,871, according to the Miami-Dade County Property Appraiser.113  For 
the five years ending in 2011, the median household income was 
$88,167,114 compared to a countywide average of $43,957.115  Kuvin was a 
waiter when he was first ticketed in 2003, but went to law school after the 
case began.116 
These facts suggest several possible arguments, all of which come 
down to the same general idea: a regulation is irrational if motivated by 
animus against a particular group. 
As a way to explain the Court’s equal-protection jurisprudence, at least 
one scholar, Susannah Pollvogt, has suggested that the underlying principle 
is one of “animus.”117  In Moreno, for example, the Court found that rules 
aimed at denying welfare benefits to “hippies” lacked a rational basis 
because a “bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group 
cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”118  That’s an example 
of what Pollvogt means by “animus.”  Pollvogt concludes that “animus is 
present where the public laws are harnessed to create and enforce 
 
111 Anthony V. Alfieri, Zachary A. Lipshultz & Steven E. Lipshultz, Find Somewhere Else to 
Park Those Trolleys, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 5, 2013, at 9A. 
112 Jenny Staletovich, Trolley-Garage Fight Continuing, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 10, 2013, at 3B 
(“‘This is a community with a very deep, troubled racial history. In our lifetime, black workers in the 
West Grove could not be in Coral Gables after dark without the permission of a homeowner,’ said 
Alfieri.”). 
113 2012 Preliminary Average and Median Residential Values, MIAMI-DADE CTY. PROP. 
APPRAISER (July 1, 2012), http://www.miamidade.gov/pa/library/reports/2012-average-median-
residential-values.pdf. 
114 State and County Quick Facts: Coral Gables, Fla., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/12/1214250.html (last updated Jan. 7, 2014, 10:50 AM). 
115 State and County Quick Facts: Miami-Dade County, Fla., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/12/12086.html (last updated Jan. 6, 2014, 5:28 PM). 
116 Susannah A. Nesmith, Overnight Truck Ban Ruled Out, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 23, 2007, at 
A1. 
117 Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887 (2012). 
118 U.S. Dep’t. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). 
28 ANDRON_PUBLISHER2 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/13/2014  8:28 PM 
2013] Can a City Declare that All Pickup Trucks Are Legally Ugly? 99 
distinctions between social groups — that is, groups of persons identified 
by status rather than conduct.”119 
The U.S. Supreme Court mentioned animus in Romer v. Evans,120 in 
which it overturned a Colorado constitutional amendment that would have 
prohibited the state from protecting gays from discrimination based on 
sexual orientation.  Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy said the 
amendment failed rational-basis scrutiny because it sought to disadvantage 
gays based on “animosity toward the class of persons affected.”121  Quoting 
Moreno, Kennedy added: “[I]f the constitutional conception of ‘equal 
protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least mean that a 
bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute 
a legitimate governmental interest.”122 
It’s important to note that Romer was a rational-basis case.  The Court 
did not hold that gays are a protected class subject to elevated scrutiny.  
Instead, the Court held that Colorado’s animus against gays made the 
constitutional amendment irrational. 
In a sign that animus remains a valid doctrine, the Court again cited to 
Moreno in a major gay marriage case this year.  United States v. Windsor123 
involved a lesbian couple that lived in New York but was legally married in 
Canada.  New York recognized the couple’s marriage, but, pursuant to the 
Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”),124 the IRS did not.125  So when one of 
the spouses died, the other had to pay $363,053 in federal estate tax.126  If 
the IRS had recognized the marriage, the surviving spouse would have 
owed nothing.127  The woman paid the tax and sued for a refund.128  The 
Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, struck down DOMA’s definition of 
marriage, holding that it was based on an improper animus, or motivation to 
hurt an unpopular group, namely gays.129 
Cases like Moreno, Romer and Windsor are relevant to Kuvin because 
they show that laws may be overturned when based on animus against a 
particular group, even if that group is not a “suspect class” entitled to 
 
119 Pollvogt, supra note 117, at 926. 
120 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996). 
121 Id. at 634. 
122 Id. (emphasis in original). 
123 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683 (2013). 
124 Codified in relevant part at 1 U.S.C. § 7, invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 
2675, 2696 (2013). 
125 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 2693 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973)). 
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elevated scrutiny.  Poor people, like gays, are not a suspect class130 but 
might still be entitled to protection from animus-based legislation.  If Kuvin 
could have developed the evidence on the legislative history of the Coral 
Gables truck ordinance, he might have been able to show that it was 
grounded in an unconstitutional animus against blue-collar people. 
This kind of argument already has an analogue in land-use law: 
exclusionary zoning.  Exclusionary zoning “is the use of a local zoning 
ordinance to promote housing segregation,” typically based on income.131  
To some extent, all zoning is “exclusionary” in that it seeks to separate uses 
thought to be incompatible, such as homes and factories.132  Moreover, 
land-use laws aimed at protecting aesthetics may naturally come into 
tension with the policy goal of ensuring that non-wealthy people have 
access to safe housing.133  However, courts or legislatures sometimes 
invalidate or prohibit government actions that take an excessive toll on 
access to affordable housing. 
The classic case is Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of 
Mount Laurel.134  In that case, the defendant municipality had 4,121 acres 
zoned for industrial use, only 100 of which were occupied.135  Nevertheless, 
the township refused to allow a nonprofit organization to build affordable 
housing unless it consisted of single-family homes on half-acre lots, which 
would have been impossible.136  The plaintiff civil rights organization sued, 
claiming the township was trying to keep low and moderate-income 
families out.137  The New Jersey Supreme Court, largely on state 
constitutional grounds, held that municipalities have a duty to provide a 
range of housing options and may not use restrictive zoning regulations to 
keep out less-wealthy families.138  Moreover, the court held that when a 
municipality fails to provide a range of housing options, the normal 
presumption of validity is reversed, such that the ordinance will be 
presumed invalid until and unless the municipality can prove otherwise.139 
 
130 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). 
131 Mandara Meyers, Comment, (Un)equal Protection for the Poor: Exclusionary Zoning and the 
Need for Stricter Scrutiny, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 349, 354 (2003). 
132 See, e.g., 2 ARDEN H. RATHKOPF ET AL., RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 
22:1 (4th ed. 2013) (“Practically all zoning restrictions have as a purpose and effect the exclusion of 
some activity or use.”). 
133 See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Judging Remedies: Judicial Approaches to Housing Segregation, 
37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 293 (2002). 
134 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975). 
135 Id. at 719. 
136 Id. at 719-20. 
137 Id. at 716. 
138 Id. at 725, 728. 
139 Id. at 728. 
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Mount Laurel was influential in bringing attention to the issue of 
exclusionary zoning,140 but states vary widely in their approach to the 
problem, and New Jersey’s approach probably is more aggressive than 
most.  In Florida, state law requires municipalities to provide land zoned for 
affordable housing,141 but enforcement is handled administratively with 
highly deferential judicial review.142 
Nevertheless, exclusionary zoning could have served as a handy 
metaphor to show the Kuvin court that the principle of Romer can apply to 
land-use and that the Florida Legislature considers affordable housing a 
policy priority. 
The exclusionary zoning concept aside, at least one reported case 
applied a kind of animus analysis in a land-use context.  In Marks v. City of 
Chesapeake, the Fourth Circuit reversed a Virginia city’s decision to deny a 
conditional-use permit for a palm reader’s shop.143  The city’s planning staff 
and Planning Commission recommended approval of the permit.144  But the 
City Council rejected the permit after a number of residents argued against 
it on religious grounds, with at least one person citing Bible verses in 
support of his arguments.145  Marks filed a civil-rights suit under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, claiming the city’s decision was “arbitrary and capricious” and 
therefore “a deprivation of property without due process of law.”146  The 
federal district court agreed, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that 
“irrational, arbitrary governmental measures taken against a politically 
unpopular target on the basis of complaining neighbors’ fears or negative 
attitudes are repugnant to constitutional guarantees.”147  Citing Cleburne, 
the court added: “As a general matter, therefore, the public’s ‘negative 
attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cognizable 
in a zoning proceeding, are not permissible bases’ for local officials’ land 
 
140 See, e.g., 3 PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AM. LAW ZONING § 22:5 (5th ed. 2013). 
141 FLA. STAT. § 163.3177 (2012). 
142 E.g., Fla. Wildlife Fed’n v. Collier Cnty., 819 So. 2d 200, 203 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (“In 
that the legislature delegated to the Department [of Community Affairs] the power to enforce section 
163.3177, we note that we are required to be highly deferential to the agency’s interpretation of such 
statute.”). 
143 Marks v. City of Chesapeake, Va., 883 F.2d 308, 309 (4th Cir. 1989). 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 309-10. 
146 Id. at 310.  Although the complaint was cast as a substantive due-process matter governed by 
an arbitrary-and-capricious standard, the test is identical to the rational-basis standard applied in cases 
like Kuvin.  See, e.g., Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1577 (11th Cir. 1989) (In 
evaluating a § 1983 complaint brought on substantive due-process grounds, the court held: “The relevant 
question for consideration is whether there existed a rational basis for the City’s rejection of 
Greenbriar’s plan, or, phrased in the alternative, whether the City’s action bore no substantial relation to 
the general welfare.”) 
147 City of Chesapeake, 883 F.2d at 310. 
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use decisions.”148 
While a fascinating case, City of Chesapeake might not hold water in 
the Eleventh Circuit to the extent that it was based on arbitrary denial of a 
state-law property right.  In the landmark149 case of McKinney v. Pate,150 the 
Eleventh Circuit held that while a government employee may have a state-
law property right in his job, state abridgement of this right is not a 
violation of substantive due process because this property right is not 
“fundamental.”151  McKinney was entitled to procedural due process such 
as notice and a fair hearing, but no more.152  The Eleventh Circuit has not 
expressly extended this holding to cover land-use decisions, but trial courts 
within the circuit have done so.  For example, in Sullivan Properties, Inc. v. 
City of Winter Springs, the Middle District of Florida found that even if the 
plaintiff developer could prove that the defendant municipality arbitrarily 
denied his land-use permit, McKinney precluded a claim for any substantive 
due-process violation.153  Likewise in Bowman v. Alabama Department of 
Human Resources, the Middle District of Alabama dismissed a complaint 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because even if state 
employees intentionally conspired to deprive the plaintiff of a day-care 
license by violating state rules, the plaintiff still failed to state a valid claim 
so long as the state correctly followed rules for a post-deprivation 
hearing.154 
Even before McKinney, the Eleventh Circuit had held in Greenbriar, 
Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, that a land-use decision doesn’t necessarily violate 
substantive due process just because it is based on political or “parochial” 
interests, at least not if the record shows other justifications for the 
decision.155  So when a Mormon church in Alabama was denied a zoning 
permit based, apparently, on the church’s political unpopularity, the 
frustrated trial judge said his hands were tied by Greenbriar: 
Strain as it may, this court can find no avenue for the [plaintiffs] 
around Greenbriar, which clearly stands for the proposition that 
 
148 Id. at 311 (quoting City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985)). 
149 Cited more than 3,500 times, including in 660 cases, according to Westlaw. 
150 20 F.3d 1550 (11th Cir. 1994). 
151 Id. at 1561 (“[A]lthough we acknowledge that McKinney’s allegations—if true—would be 
lamentable, we nonetheless cannot find that . . . McKinney’s right to employment is so fundamental that 
our democratic society and its inherent freedoms would be lost if that right were to be violated. . . . As 
such, we likewise cannot find that McKinney’s state-created property right is deserving of substantive 
due process protection.”) 
152 Id. 
153 899 F. Supp. 587, 596 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (“Sullivan may only bring a procedural due process 
claim for Winter Springs’ alleged violations of Sullivan’s rights.”) (emphasis added). 
154 857 F. Supp. 1524, 1530 (M.D. Ala. 1994). 
155 881 F.2d 1570, 1579 (11th Cir. 1989). 
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elected officials who vote on zoning requests can act for purely 
political reasons, because partisan, political decision-making, even by 
unknowledgeable, close-minded politicians fearful of harm more than 
political, is automatically deemed rational and, therefore, cannot be 
arbitrary and capricious unless it is the product of corruption. . .156 
Greenbriar was effectively mooted by the even more government-
friendly decision in McKinney, but the former case shows just how reluctant 
some courts can be to over-rule local land-use decisions. 
Nevertheless, Kuvin could have attempted to portray the ordinance as 
a holdover from a bygone era of economic discrimination, cut from the 
same cloth as Jim Crow laws. 
The argument has its weaknesses.  In particular, we have no evidence 
that current city officials were motivated by any animus against working-
class people, and the evidence against the 1960s city leaders is somewhat 
circumstantial.  In addition, pickup trucks no longer have an exclusively 
blue-collar association, as evidenced by the availability of a Cadillac model.  
But the evidence was sufficient to persuade judges like Hurley and 
Schwartz that there was class snobbery afoot, and that was without Romer 
to provide a legal framework to their intuitions.  Perhaps with further 
development of the evidence and this additional legal argument, Kuvin 
might have persuaded others on the bench. 
2. Ordinances that Ban Common, Harmless Activities Fail on Rational 
Basis 
Despite the strong presumption of validity of a municipal ordinance, 
Florida appellate courts have occasionally struck down local ordinances 
under a state version of the rational-basis test.157  On the one hand, these 
cases are not recent, generally dating to the 1970s or earlier, and they cover 
a variety of subjects, some having little relation to land use.  But on the 
other hand, these cases have not been expressly overruled, and were based 
either on a clearly identifiable rational-basis test, or on a similar test of 
reasonableness. 
It would be hard to characterize these cases as a whole, but Kuvin may 
have been on to something when he argued that “the complete prohibition 
of ordinary conduct should be viewed with great suspicion.”158  To support 
 
156 Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Jefferson Cnty., Ala., 721 F. Supp. 1212, 1214 
(N.D. Ala. 1989) (emphasis in original).  First Amendment free-exercise complaints were allowed to 
proceed, however. 
157 See, e.g., 12A FLA. JUR. 2D Counties § 222 (2014) (listing four cases in which ordinances 
were found to be based on unreasonable classifications). 
158 Brief for Petitioner at 26, Kuvin v. City of Coral Gables, 62 So. 3d 604 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2007) (No. 3D05–2845). 
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this proposition, Kuvin cites Carter v. Town of Palm Beach,159 a 1970 case 
in which the Florida Supreme Court struck down a total ban on surfing.  
Although he did not do so, Kuvin also might have cited the 1957 case of 
City of Miami v. Kayfetz,160 in which the state’s highest court struck down 
an ordinance prohibiting bars from serving drinks to employees, even when 
off-duty. 
While no lawyer would want to rely too heavily on two cases of that 
vintage, Carter and Kayfetz both stand clearly for the proposition that a 
municipal ordinance may be struck down under a rational-basis test if the 
relationship between the ordinance and the purported state interest is just 
too attenuated.  And while Kuvin’s argument that “the complete prohibition 
of ordinary conduct should be viewed with great suspicion” is just that–an 
argument and not the law–a good case can be made that he was right. 
Kayfetz involved a City of Miami ordinance aimed at stopping a 
practice whereby female bar employees known as “B-girls” would ask male 
patrons to buy them drinks.161  The B-girls received commissions for each 
drink a patron bought for them.162  Sometimes the bars would provide the 
women with nonalcoholic beverages but charge the customer for a mixed 
drink.163  The Miami ordinance contained several provisions, banning: (1) 
female bar employees from mingling or fraternizing with customers; (2) bar 
employees from soliciting drinks for themselves; (3) women from loitering 
in a bar for the purpose of soliciting drinks; and (4) bar employees from 
drinking liquor in their workplaces, or bar owners from serving them.164 
The court carefully recited the presumptions in favor of the city and its 
ordinance.  The court was bound to “assume that a valid ordinance was 
intended” and to “construe the ordinance to be legal, if possible.”165  
“Further, the courts should be very cautious in declaring a municipal 
ordinance unreasonable,” on the premise that the democratically elected city 
leaders know best what their community wants and needs.166  And, the court 
said, “[i]f reasonable argument exists on the question of whether the 
ordinance is arbitrary or unreasonable, the legislative will must prevail.”167 
 
159 237 So. 2d 130, 131-32 (Fla. 1970). 
160 92 So. 2d 798, 803-04 (Fla. 1957). 
161 Id. at 800. 
162 Id. This practice evidently continues.  At least a dozen people were convicted for a similar 
scam in Miami Beach in 2012.  The women were still known as B-girls.  The FBI handled the 
investigation, which reportedly involved as much as $1 million in losses to victims.  E.g., Jay Weaver, 3 
convicted in ‘B-girls’ rip-off case, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 20, 2012, at B1. 
163 Kayfetz, 92 So. 2d at 800. 
164 Id. at 799-800. 
165 Id. at 801. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
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Explaining the purpose of the ordinance, Miami’s mayor and city 
manager testified that the B-girls induce male patrons to buy drinks “by the 
visions, or promises, express or implied, of immoral relations with the 
girls,” and that the practice also could facilitate prostitution.168  Based on 
these facts, the court found that the city had articulated what we would now 
call a legitimate governmental interest in protecting the morals169 of the 
citizens and visitors to Miami.170 
The Kayfetz court then upheld three of the four challenged provisions 
in Miami’s ordinance.  To reach that conclusion, the court considered 
whether each provision was connected to stopping the immoral B-girl 
system.  For instance, the court found “a rational relation” between the anti-
mingling provision and the goal of stopping B-girls,171 because a B-girl 
must mingle with a customer in order to entice him to buy her drinks.  The 
court said the same about the provision banning employees from soliciting 
drinks from customers.172  And, the court said, if the police power allows 
the city to stop bar employees from soliciting drinks, “it necessarily 
follows” that the rule against women173 “loitering” in bars seeking drinks 
also must be valid.174 
But the court struck down the provision banning bars from selling 
alcoholic beverages to their employees.  The reason: the court said it saw 
“no more connection” between the city’s stated interest in morality and 
employees drinking in bars than between the city’s stated interest and 
customers drinking in bars.175  The purpose of the ordinance was not to 
limit drinking but to limit the “mingling and fraternizing by the female 
employees” and solicitation of drinks that could amount to fraud and lead to 
immoral conduct.176 
 
168 Id. at 800. 
169 Florida follows the standard formulation that the police power allows regulations intended to 
protect the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.  E.g., Div. of Pari-Mutuel Wagering Dep’t of 
Bus. Regulation v. Florida Horse Council, Inc., 464 So. 2d 128, 130 (Fla. 1985) (holding that a ban on 
Sunday horse-racing encourages people “to spend their weekend leisure time at non-gambling, 
presumably more healthy recreational pursuits and other activities”).  Florida also is one of a small 
number of states that still has a criminal statute on the books banning non-marital cohabitation, FLA. 
STAT. § 798.02, although the validity of this law was cast into doubt by Lawrence v. Texas, 553 U.S. 
558 (2003). 
170 Kayfetz, 92 So. 2d at 802. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. at 803. 
173 Kayfetz was decided long before the U.S. Supreme Court had articulated that classifications 
based on gender are subject to elevated scrutiny.  E.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (“To 
withstand constitutional challenge . . . classifications by gender must serve important governmental 
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”). 
174 Kayfetz, 92 So. 2d at 804. 
175 Id. at 803. 
176 Id. at 803-04. 
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In Carter, the Florida Supreme Court struck down an absolute ban on 
surfing anywhere along the Town of Palm Beach’s 13 miles of beachfront.  
The court cited a 1934 case, Inglis v. Rymer,177 in which it held that a 
municipality could regulate skating rinks but not ban them altogether 
because they are not nuisances per se.  Therefore, the court said, “the power 
to restrain and regulate does not include the power to prohibit an activity 
which is not a nuisance per se.”178  This statement appears to contradict the 
court’s previous cases, discussed above, in which it declared aesthetics 
alone to be sufficient basis for a municipal regulation.  Those cases said 
nothing about the severity of the aesthetic harm having to rise to the level of 
nuisance. 
Nuisance in Florida is “using one’s property as to injure the land or 
some incorporeal right of one’s neighbor.”179  The Carter court referenced a 
specific category of nuisance, the “nuisance per se.”  Florida courts have 
tended to decide what is or is not a nuisance per se on a use-by-use basis,180 
but “[g]enerally, before a thing becomes a nuisance per se at common law, 
it must be either unlawful in itself or of such inherent qualities that its 
natural tendency, wherever located, is to produce injury.”181  So the Carter 
court seems to be saying that if a municipality wants to categorically ban 
something, then that something must be categorically obnoxious. 
In other words, the absolute ban on surfing was so over-inclusive as to 
be irrational.  If the town believed that surfing interfered with swimming or 
other activities on the beach, it could limit surfing to designated areas.182  
But “[t]here does not appear to be anything inherently obnoxious or illegal, 
per se, about surfing that requires or necessitates it being totally prohibited, 
anymore than it would be reasonable to prohibit fishing entirely along the 
shore of the ocean within the Town.”183  This sounds a lot like judges 
 
177 152 So. 4 (Fla. 1934). 
178 Carter v. Town of Palm Beach, 237 So. 2d 130, 131 (Fla. 1970).  The court’s language about 
nuisance could be seen as presaging Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), in which the 
federal Supreme Court would hold that a regulation that prevents all use of a piece of real property 
amounts to a taking unless the regulation merely prevents the owner from doing something he could not 
have done under the state law of nuisance. 
179 Beckman v. Marshall, 85 So. 2d 552, 554 (Fla. 1956) (adopting language from Antonik v. 
Chamberlain, 78 N.E.2d 752, 758 (Ohio Ct. App. 1947)) (internal citations omitted). 
180 E,g., State ex rel. Knight v. City of Miami, 53 So. 2d 636, 637 (Fla. 1951) (holding garbage 
disposal plant not a nuisance per se); Brooks v. Patterson, 31 So. 2d 472, 474 (Fla. 1947) (holding 
airport is not a nuisance per se); Fla. E. Coast Props., Inc. v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 572 F.2d 1108, 1112 
(5th Cir. 1978) (holding jail/work release facility not a nuisance per se). 
181 Fla. E. Coast Props., Inc., 572 F.2d at 1112 (citing 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances § 13). 
182 Carter v. Town of Palm Beach, 237 So. 2d 130, 131 (Fla. 1970) (quoting an unpublished 
opinion of the local circuit court, which ordinarily is a trial court but in the case heard the first appeal 
from the municipal court). 
183 Id. 
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Schwartz and Cortiñas’ opinions in Kuvin.  It also sounds like the court is 
calling for the municipality to factually justify its ordinance, which, as 
discussed above, most courts do not think municipalities should have to do 
in rational-basis cases. 
Nonetheless, a strong argument can be made that the Florida Supreme 
Court got it right in both Kayfetz and Carter.  Both cases acknowledge that 
the government exceeds its authority when it absolutely bans a harmless 
and commonplace activity — such as bar employees drinking in their 
workplace when off duty in Kayfetz, and surfing in Carter. 
Nor are these cases unique.  In Delmonico v. State,184 the Florida 
Supreme Court struck down a state law banning possession of spearfishing 
equipment anywhere in Monroe County,185 where the purpose of the statute 
was to help enforce a ban on spearfishing in some areas of the county.  The 
statute had the effect of preventing spearfishing even in places where it was 
legal – in effect making it over-inclusive.  “In order to meet constitutional 
limitations on police regulation, this prohibition, i.e. against possession of 
objects having a common and widespread lawful use, must under our 
previous decisions be reasonably ‘required as incidental to the 
accomplishment of the primary purpose of the Act.’”186  In other words, if 
the State wanted to limit a commonplace activity, the terms of the 
regulation had to be rationally related to the State’s goals. 
The Florida Supreme Court made the same point in Inglis, when it 
found that the state could limit roller-skating rinks, but not ban such a 
“harmless” activity otherwise permitted under state law.187 
A number of points may be made in response to this argument. 
First, the cases cited are few and old.  It could be argued that they are 
outdated, harkening to a time when courts were more inclined to limit the 
police power.  But Kayfetz and Carter, for example, both came after the 
U.S. Supreme Court held in Berman that the police power is broad enough 
to include the power to regulate aesthetics.  Kayfetz and Carter also came 
after Florida adopted Euclid’s “fairly debatable” standard and applied it to 
aesthetics in Ocean and Inland Co.  In other words, by the time of Kayfetz 
and Carter, the Florida Supreme Court already had given municipalities 
enormous leeway to regulate within the police power, but overturned the 
surfing and drinking ordinances anyway.  One way to interpret this pattern 
of cases is to conclude that while the court recognized the power of 
municipalities to regulate aesthetics, it did not recognize a municipal power 
 
184 155 So. 2d 368, 370 (Fla. 1963). 
185 Monroe County contains the Florida Keys, a chain of islands and a popular fishing area. 
186 Delmonico, 155 So. 2d at 370 (emphasis added). 
187 Inglis v. Rymer, 152 So. 4, 5 (Fla. 1934). 
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to ban harmless and commonplace activities.  Therefore, an aesthetic 
regulation is not “fairly debatable” or rationally related to aesthetics if it has 
the effect of banning a harmless and commonplace activity. 
The syllogism is easily completed by adding that nighttime parking of 
a noncommercial pickup truck in a residential neighborhood, like surfing or 
adult drinking in a bar, is a commonplace and harmless activity that may 
not be absolutely banned.  At the very least, this argument seems strong 
enough to overcome the presumption of legislative validity, and demand 
evidence from the municipality to show the harm created by pickup trucks. 
Another criticism of this argument is that the cases discussed above are 
not about aesthetically based land-use regulations.  Had the Florida 
Supreme Court never ruled on the specific question of whether aesthetics 
are a sufficient basis to support a land-use regulation, the Kayfetz line of 
cases would be more persuasive, but in light of cases like Ocean and Inland 
Co., the more specific rule should prevail.  This is a valid point, but still 
does nothing to explain the difference between Ocean and Inland Co. on 
the one hand and cases like Carter and Inglis on the other.  Put another 
way, if a city can’t ban roller-rinks or surfing, how can it ban pickup 
trucks? 
REMOVING ROADBLOCKS 
The arguments above are available under current law.  But it may be 
that these arguments are too tenuous, and that the Kuvin court was bound to 
uphold Coral Gables’s ordinance under rational-basis scrutiny.  On the 
other hand, as discussed above, the fact that Kuvin was unable to keep a 
pickup truck in Coral Gables will strike many people, including many who 
think Judge Rothenberg was correct on the law, as anomalous or even 
absurd.  When correct application of the law leads to such a result, the law 
may need to be tweaked. 
The following sections suggest some relatively modest changes that 
might avoid anomalous results like the one in Kuvin. 
1. Limiting the Application of the Police Power to Aesthetics 
As discussed above, Berman v. Parker and its progeny held that the 
police power permits states to regulate aesthetics.  But just because the U.S. 
Supreme Court doesn’t limit state power to regulate aesthetics doesn’t mean 
that states can’t impose their own limits. 
And indeed, the Florida Legislature has a demonstrated interest in 
limiting the state’s power over land use even when judges say the state 
could go further.  A great example is the state’s reaction to Kelo v. City of 
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New London,188 in which the U.S. Supreme Court allowed the defendant 
city to take private homes and transfer them to a private company for 
redevelopment purposes even though the locality made no claim that the 
homes were blighted.  Less than a year after the Court announced Kelo, the 
Florida Legislature passed a law189 limiting the use of eminent domain to 
traditional purposes, such as highways and power lines, and expressly 
prohibiting its use for urban renewal even when blight is shown.190  “We 
have eliminated the Kelo problem,” said state Representative Dwight 
Stansel, a Democrat, at the time.191  But lawmakers went further, calling a 
referendum to enshrine an anti-Kelo provision in the state constitution.  In 
November 2006, the amendment passed by a two-to-one margin.192  The 
amendment created a new provision in the state constitution,193 requiring a 
three-fifths majority for the Legislature to transfer condemned property to a 
private party.194 
The Florida Legislature has responded similarly to state court 
decisions that limit compensation for regulatory takings to cases in which a 
regulation “deprives the owner of substantial economic use of his or her 
property.”195  In response, the Legislature in 1995 passed the Bert J. Harris, 
Jr., Private Property Rights Protection Act,196 which created a new cause of 
action for property owners against state agencies whose regulations 
“inordinately burden” a particular private tract.197 
 
188 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
189 FLA. STAT. §§ 73.013-73.014 (2012). 
190 One of the noteworthy facts of Kelo was that the Court permitted the taking despite the 
absence of any showing of blight.  Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483 (“Those who govern the City were not 
confronted with the need to remove blight . . . but their determination that the area was sufficiently 
distressed to justify a program of economic rejuvenation is entitled to our deference.”). 
191 Alex Leary, Limits on Property Seizures Go to Governor, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 5, 
2006, at 5B. 
192 Carrie Weimar, Crimping Eminent Domain, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 13, 2006, at 1B. 
193 FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6(c). 
194 Another oft-criticized aspect of the Kelo decision was the Court’s willingness to allow a city 
to take unblighted land from one private party and then transfer it to another private party.  E.g., Kelo, 
545 U.S. at 500 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court today significantly expands the meaning of 
public use.  It holds that the sovereign may take private property currently put to ordinary private use, 
and give it over for new, ordinary private use . . . .”). 
195 E.g., Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 563 So. 2d 622, 625 (Fla. 1990) (citing Penn 
Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138 n.36 (1978)). 
196 FLA. STAT. § 70.001 (2012). 
197 The Act’s actual effectiveness in aiding landowners seems to have been dubious at best.  E.g., 
Susan L. Trevarthen, Advising the Client Regarding Protection of Property Rights: Harris Act and 
Inverse Condemnation Claims, FLA. B.J., July/August 2004, at 61, 65 (calling the Act a “paper tiger”).  
Nevertheless, it illustrates the Florida Legislature’s interest in rebalancing the judicial scales away from 
the government and in favor of private property owners.  See, e.g., John T. Marshall, The Property 
Rights Movement and Historic Preservation in Florida: The Impact of the Bert J. Harris, Jr. Private 
Property Protection Act, 8 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 285 (1997) (“Florida shot to the forefront of 
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Florida could take similar steps to curb over-reaching aesthetic 
regulations.  Several avenues could be used for this purpose. 
For example, Florida could join those states that hold that aesthetics 
alone are insufficient to support a regulation. 
But such a scheme would raise practical challenges.  First, in the past, 
courts employing an “aesthetics plus” rule have often accepted dubious 
claims of an additional governmental interest to justify what appeared to be 
a wholly aesthetics-driven regulation.  For example, in St. Louis Gunning 
Advertisement Co. v. City of St. Louis, the Missouri Supreme Court held 
that regulation of property on purely aesthetic grounds might be tantamount 
to a taking,198 but a St. Louis billboard ordinance was nevertheless valid 
because billboards “constitute hiding places and retreats for criminals and 
all classes of miscreants.”199  Professor Edward H. Ziegler, Jr. says this was 
a common “bootstrapping technique to circumvent the prohibition of early 
period aesthetic doctrine.”200 
It seems hard to imagine a modern court accepting a sham public 
purpose for a billboard ordinance, but modern courts have often been 
willing to defer to localities on land-use decisions even at the expense of 
individual property rights.  The prototypical case is Kelo,201 in which the 
Supreme Court deferred to the defendant city’s judgment that transferring a 
private home to a business for a private development was a “public use.”202 
Moreover, it’s easy for a locality to come up with a public purpose that 
purports to be “in addition to” aesthetics, but really just provides the same 
justification in different words.  For example, a locality could say an 
aesthetic rule is needed to preserve property values or to protect the 
residential character of a neighborhood.  So long as the state’s bare 
assertion of such an interest is sufficient, courts would have little choice but 
to defer to the government. 
One obvious fix to the latter problem would be to use a burden-shifting 
regime, whereby if a plaintiff makes a prima facie case that an aesthetic 
 
the national property rights movement when Governor Lawton Chiles signed the Bert J. Harris, Jr. 
Private Property Protection Act.”). 
198 137 S.W. 929, 952 (1911), dismissed per stipulation sub nom. St. Louis Gunning Adver. Co 
v. City of St. Louis, 231 U.S. 761 (1913). 
199 Id. at 942. 
200 2 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, JR., RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 16:4 (4th 
ed. 2013). 
201 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
202 In criticizing the majority’s holding, Justice Thomas questioned why the court was so 
deferential to the city here when it would never defer to the city on other constitutional matters, such as 
whether a police search was unconstitutional.  Kelo, 545 U.S. at 518 (“[T]here is no justification for the 
almost complete deference [the Court] grants to legislatures as to what” constitutes a public purpose.) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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regulation is unrelated or only tenuously related to the asserted state 
interest, the burden then shifts to the state to show the rational relationship.  
But this is not how rational-basis is applied under current law.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court has held: 
In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that 
neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental 
constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge 
if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide 
a rational basis for the classification.  Where there are “plausible 
reasons” for Congress’ action, “our inquiry is at an end.”  This 
standard of review is a paradigm of judicial restraint.  “The 
Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even 
improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic 
process and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no 
matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted.”203 
Moreover, a state “has no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the 
rationality of a statutory classification.”204  And “[t]he burden is on the one 
attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis 
which might support it.”205  In theory, then, no matter how strong a case a 
plaintiff can make that a law is not rationally related to the state’s purported 
interest, the state need never marshal a shred of evidence to defend itself.206 
This stands in contrast with elevated levels of scrutiny, where the state 
must show some degree of fit between its law and its purpose.  That’s why 
in Gold Coast Publications, the City of Coral Gables crafted a detailed 
scheme of objectively quantifiable measurements and color palettes in its 
regulation of newspaper racks.207  Knowing it would face elevated scrutiny 
because of First Amendment issues, the city made sure its regulations were 
tied as closely as possible to aesthetic uniformity (in terms of size, color 
and typeface) and safety (requiring placement of racks away from curb cuts, 
for example).  That way, the city was able to prove its goals really were 
aesthetics and safety and not suppression of speech. 
A burden-shifting scheme for aesthetic regulations might balance the 
 
203 F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1993) (emphasis added) (internal 
citations omitted). 
204 Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (emphasis added). 
205 Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940) (emphasis added). 
206 The presumption of validity of local ordinances is remarkably broad.  See, e.g., 6 MCQUILLIN 
MUN. CORP. § 20:7 (3d ed. 2013). 
207 Gold Coast Publ’ns, Inc. v. Corrigan, 42 F.3d 1336, 1346 (11th Cir. 1994) (“The Ordinance 
does not completely ban newsracks from public rights-of-way or prohibit the sale and distribution of 
newspapers.  Similarly, publishers are permitted to display their name or logo in the color of their choice 
so long as the lettering is no larger than 1 ¾ inches.”). 
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interests of the government with those of plaintiffs like Kuvin.  If plaintiffs 
show a weak connection between the regulation and aesthetics–for example, 
by showing that the law permits rusted cars but not Cadillac pickup trucks–
the burden would shift to the city to show that the law is reasonably related 
to some state interest other than aesthetics.  For instance, the city could 
show evidence that pick-up trucks harm property values.  The government 
would not have to justify every aesthetic regulation, however, but only 
those in which a plaintiff with proper standing is able to make a case for 
irrationality.  Local officials would nevertheless likely warn that the 
regulation would be onerous, and only time and experience would prove 
whether they are correct.208 
Another way Florida could limit Berman would be to limit purely 
aesthetic regulations to those designed to protect the public from the most 
severe eyesores.  This seems to be the law in Ohio.  In that state, a land-use 
regulation may be based on aesthetics only if: (1) it also has a “real and 
substantial relationship” to another state interest;209 or (2) the aesthetic harm 
would be “generally patent and gross, and not merely a matter of taste.”210  
This latter rule would have the advantage of protecting plaintiffs like Kuvin 
by exempting purely aesthetic regulations from Euclid’s “fairly debatable” 
standard.  In effect, the second Ohio rule says that purely aesthetic 
regulations should be presumed invalid, rather than valid, if they are fairly 
debatable matters of taste.  But where reasonable people would not likely 
disagree – as with an unfenced automobile junkyard – the regulation would 
be valid. 
It is difficult to imagine that any court would find “patent and gross” 
aesthetic harm from a pickup truck, but an Ohio municipality might 
nevertheless be able to wedge through a Coral Gables-type ordinance under 
the state’s first rule, by arguing that it has a “real and substantial” 
relationship to separating commercial and residential uses. 
But even if the first rule were omitted, Ohio’s scheme would be 
problematic.  The government could simply refrain from citing aesthetics, 
and instead point to property values as the basis of its regulation.  
Moreover, judges would find themselves in the unenviable position of 
having to decide what aesthetic harm is “patent and gross.” 
 
208 For example, the Florida League of Cities opposed the post-Kelo state constitutional 
amendment. Weimar, supra note 192, at 36. 
209 Edward H. Ziegler Jr., Aesthetics in Ohio Land Use Law: Preserving Beauty in the Parlor and 
Keeping Pigs in the Barnyard, 19 AKRON L. REV. 1, 32 (1985); Ghaster Props., Inc. v. Preston, 200 
N.E.2d 328, 334 (Ohio 1964); Vill. of Hudson v. Albrecht, Inc., 458 N.E.2d 852, 856 (Ohio 1984) (“The 
cases also reflect the thought that aesthetics is not a concern of the public health, safety or general 
welfare, but is, at most, an incidental or secondary reason for enacting legislation.”). 
210 Ziegler, supra note 209, at 13; State v. Buckley, 243 N.E.2d 66, 70 (Ohio 1968). 
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Another option would be to adopt a balancing test that weighs the 
public benefits of an aesthetic regulation against the private burdens it 
creates.  New York has at times employed such a rule, requiring “a proper 
balance between the welfare of the public and the rights of the private 
owner.”211 
2. Allow Variances for Aesthetic Regulations 
 
 Strictly speaking, Coral Gables did not ban pickup trucks.  As applied 
to Lowell Kuvin, however, the city did ban his pickup truck because he had 
no garage in which to hide it. 
The courts look with disfavor on zoning regulations that create 
needless hardship on individual property owners.  In fact, when a land-use 
regulation lacks a procedure for making an exception, known as a variance, 
based on the limitations of a particular property, the regulation may be 
unenforceable as applied to the particular property.212 
A variance is a form of relief from a land-use regulation limited to a 
single property.  Variances were originally developed to help owners of 
property whose topography makes it impracticable to comply with a 
regulation, typically one pertaining to spacing.  Because variances allow an 
owner to use land that otherwise might be rendered useless, they also help 
localities to avoid effecting a regulatory taking.213 
The traditional standard for a variance is that complying with the 
regulation would create a hardship for the landowner, and that this hardship 
was not self-imposed.  Increasingly, courts do not consider the fact that a 
landowner bought a home after the regulation was enacted to be conclusive 
proof that the hardship was self-created, even if the buyer knew of the 
rule.214  However, Florida follows the old rule, which is that a variance 
generally does not lie when the owner bought the property knowing of the 
regulation.215  Buyers of real property are charged with constructive 
knowledge of applicable zoning regulations.216  Still, a variance may be 
 
211 Shepard v. Vill. of Skaneateles, 89 N.E.2d 619, 620 (N.Y. 1949); see also 1 N.Y. ZONING 
LAW & PRAC. § 6:16 (2013). 
212 E.g., Innkeepers Motor Lodge, Inc. v. City of New Smyrna Beach, 460 So. 2d 379, 380 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (citing 8 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25:50 (3d ed. 
1983)). 
213 The government effects a regulatory taking when it enacts a regulation that denies a 
landowner all economically beneficial use of her property.  See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 
1015 (1992). 
214 3 ARDEN H. RATHKOPF ET AL., RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 58:22 
(4th ed. 2013). 
215 Josephson v. Autrey, 96 So. 2d 784, 789 (Fla. 1957). 
216 E.g., Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Fontainebleau Gas & Wash, Inc., 570 So. 2d 1006, 1007 (Fla. Dist. 
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permissible if, regardless of the landowner’s improvident decision, the 
property would have qualified for a variance before he bought it.217  In 
Florida, the hardship should not be shared with other property owners in the 
area.218 
Although variances are most commonly sought by property owners, on 
behalf of themselves or a prospective buyer, leaseholders also appear to 
have standing to seek a variance.219 
Florida does not have a statewide statutory standard that an applicant 
must meet to support a variance.220  As a result, different localities have 
different rules.221  Nevertheless, “Florida courts have held that a legal 
hardship will be found to exist only in those cases where the property is 
virtually unusable or incapable of yielding a reasonable return when used 
pursuant to the applicable zoning regulations.”222 
 
Ct. App. 1990) (“Owners are deemed to purchase property with constructive knowledge of applicable 
land use regulations.”) (citing several cases establishing this rule).  This rule is well-established in 
Florida law, but an argument could be made that an exception should be made in the case of a purchaser 
of a homestead seeking a variance from an unusual ordinance provision.  The unusual ordinance 
provision becomes like a surprising term in a contract of adhesion.  “An additional term included in a 
written confirmation is considered to be a material alteration which will not become part of the contract 
if the term’s inclusion will result in surprise or hardship if incorporated without an express awareness by 
the other party.”  67 AM. JUR. 2D Sales § 155 (2014).  If an ordinance provision has a term a reasonable 
homebuyer would not expect, and in fact did not know about, and which other municipalities do not 
have, then the buyer should be allowed to apply for a variance without being charged with constructive 
knowledge of the provision.  In support of this argument, note that the Florida Supreme Court has 
highlighted a commercial buyer’s “full knowledge” of land-use rules in finding that a hardship was self-
created.  Autrey, 96 So. 2d at 789. 
217 City of Coral Gables v. Geary, 383 So. 2d 1127, 1128 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). 
218 Herrera v. City of Miami, 600 So. 2d 561, 561 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (citing Nance v. 
Town of Indialantic, 419 So. 2d 1041 (Fla.1982)). 
219 See, e.g., Vill. of Key Biscayne v. Dade Cnty., 627 So. 2d 1180, 1181 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1993) (holding that an aquarium operator was allowed to seek variances on leased land); Crossroads 
Lounge, Inc. v. City of Miami, 195 So. 2d 232, 235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (holding that a lessee was 
allowed to seek variance to permit alcohol sales) (rev’d other grounds).  For a national survey of who 
has standing to seek a variance, see W.C. Crais III, Annotation, Zoning: who may apply for variance, 
special exception, or use permit, or appeal from denial thereof, 89 A.L.R.2D 663 (1963) (“While there is 
authority to the contrary, a lessee has been regarded as having sufficient standing to apply in his own 
right for a zoning variance as to the leased property, or to appeal from the denial thereof.”). 
220 Patricia E. Salkin, States whose statutes are silent on variances – Local jurisdictions 
determine variance standards, 2 AM. LAW. ZONING § 13:13 (2013). 
221 E.g., compare TOWN OF CUTLER BAY, FLA., LAND DEVELOPMENT REGULATIONS § 3-36 
(“Owners of lands or structures may apply to the Town Council for a variance from the requirements or 
restrictions of the Land Development Regulations; except that no variance for use or density issues shall 
be considered.”) (emphasis added) with MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 33-311(A)(4)(a) 
(specifying that use variances may be granted “as will not be contrary to the public interest, where 
owing to special conditions, a literal enforcement of the provisions thereof will result in unnecessary 
hardship, and so the spirit of the regulations shall be observed and substantial justice done; provided, 
that the use variance will be in harmony with the general purpose and intent of the regulation . . . .”). 
222 Maturo v. City of Coral Gables, 619 So. 2d 455, 456 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993). 
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It’s worth noting that municipalities are widely thought to misapply 
variance law much of the time, and to grant or deny variances for extralegal 
reasons.223  The “boards of adjustment” that commonly hear variance cases 
are made up of laypeople.224  Their opinions may or may not be placed in 
writing, and may not be indexed or published.225  In short: 
A conventional wisdom has developed that the zoning variance is 
widely abused – that it is used to quietly grant special favors to the 
politically connected, that uneducated lay boards apply their peculiar 
notion of justice rather than judiciously applying narrowly defined 
legal standards . . . .226 
In general, variances ordinarily apply to real property.  But one of the 
purposes of granting variances is to avoid effecting a regulatory taking, and 
the takings clause “applies equally to real and personal property, including 
motor vehicles.”227  Not so clear is whether a land-use regulation can effect 
a taking of a motor vehicle.  Several past cases have hinted that a regulation 
 
223 E.g., Jonathan E. Cohen, A Constitutional Safety Valve: The Variance in Zoning and Land-
Use Based Environmental Controls, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 307, 308 (1995) (“Local 
decisionmaking bodies have been found frequently to base decisions to grant or deny variances on 
inappropriate and substantially irrelevant factors.”); Ronald M. Shapiro, The Zoning Variance Power—
Constructive in Theory, Destructive in Practice, 29 MD. L. REV. 3 (1969) (“Board decisions are 
frequently the product of improper considerations . . . .”). 
224 For example, variance requests in the Village of Miami Shores, Fla., are heard by the village’s 
Planning Board, whose members are appointed by the Village Council, with no special skills or 
knowledge required.  MIAMI SHORES, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 8.5-70, 19-16 et seq. (2013). 
225 As an example here is the entire record of a variance decision by the Miami Shores Planning 
Board, as found in the board’s minutes.  Meeting Minutes Miami Shores Village Planning Board (June 
23, 2011), available at 
http://miamishoresvillage.com/Planning_____Zoning/Minutes/Minutes%202011/Minutes%20PZ-11-06-
23.htm. 
PZ 3-11-2011232 
Jose Castro (Owner) 
9701 Biscayne Blvd. 
Article VII. Errors and Variances; Sec. 702 Hardship variances: Sec 518. Fences walls and hedges. 
(a) Maximum height: (4) Variance to allow gate exceeding height limitation. 
The Chairman summarized at the last hearing the applicant addressed the Board. The Board 
requested the applicant to provide documentation to back up his statements. 
The applicant addressed the Board and provided pictures and applied applications for fences from 
his neighbors. The Board questioned the applicant about his knowledge of the surrounding homes 
being historic homes. After a discussion by the board, Mr. Abramitis moved to deny this 
application.  Mr. Reese seconded the motion and the vote was unanimous in favor of the motion 5-
0. 
Additional background information might be available in the agenda packet, but it would shed light only 
on facts and not on the board’s reasoning. 
226 David W. Owens, The Zoning Variance: Reappraisal and Recommendations for Reform of A 
Much-Maligned Tool, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 279, 280 (2004). 
227 In re Forfeiture of 1976 Kenworth Tractor Trailer Truck, Altered VIN 243340M, 576 So. 2d 
261, 263 (Fla. 1990). 
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that entirely excludes a type of vehicle from residential districts might 
effect a taking.228  Unfortunately, the language used in those decisions only 
made it clear that such a regulation might be unconstitutional, without 
spelling out whether the problem was a taking or over-breadth. 
Kuvin might have sought a variance based on the premise that the 
ordinance unfairly burdened him, and that allowing him to park his truck on 
his property would have no effect on property values or aesthetics.  His 
home had no garage, so he could not keep his pickup truck at his home, and 
comply with the city’s requirement that it be kept in a garage.  He rented his 
home, but even if he owned it, the cost of building a garage would likely 
have exceeded the value of his vehicle, assuming such a project was even 
possible given the size of his lot and city spacing regulations.  Given the 
age of the housing stock in Coral Gables, Kuvin might have argued that his 
was a reasonable case for a variance.  The city could have conditioned the 
variance by limiting where he could park and requiring him to keep the 
truck’s bed empty. 
CONCLUSION 
The theory underlying rational-basis review is that it allows individual 
communities to create their own aesthetic regulations subject mainly to 
political, rather than judicial, accountability.  Of course, whether this 
balance is satisfactory may depend on whether your ox is being gored. 
The Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the U.S. Constitution 
protect “insular minorities” and a few other groups from discrimination, and 
they provide some protection to everyone else when fundamental liberties 
are implicated. 
But many–perhaps most–government actions neither target minorities 
nor affect such basic rights as speech or religion.  In these cases, state police 
power is vast, and its limits hard to define, especially under the murky law 
of the rational-basis test. 
The result is a case like Kuvin, which seems to defy common 
expectations of what the government can or can’t do.  Surely it can’t tell us 
what kind of car we can drive, or whether we can park it in our own 
driveway? 
As this paper shows, the answer depends on how judges see the limits 
of the police power under rational-basis scrutiny.  If courts apply the test in 
 
228 E.g., City of Coral Gables v. Wood, 305 So. 2d 261, 263 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (holding 
that the prohibition on parking campers in a residential district was reasonable in light of the exception 
allowing them in garages); Proctor v. City of Coral Springs, 396 So. 2d 771, 772 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1981) (distinguishing Wood from other cases, saying “[s]torage of the vehicles was permitted within a 
garage or other structure, and therefore the ordinance did not unconstitutionally deprive the owners of a 
right to have camper-type vehicles”). 
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its simplest terms, Kuvin loses because laws of debatable rationality must 
be upheld. 
But cases like Romer, Cleburne, Moreno, Carter, and Kayfetz suggest 
that state actions on the edge of rationality may call for a more nuanced 
approach.  While stopping short of substituting their judgment for that of 
the legislature, courts must consider whether (1) the state action is 
motivated by irrational animus, and (2) whether the state seeks to ban some 
ordinary and harmless activity. 
On the other hand, these arguments will not sway every judge, at least 
as applied to Lowell Kuvin’s pickup truck.  If that’s the case, then a change 
or clarification in the law may be needed to define the outermost limits of 
the state’s power to regulate aesthetics. 
Otherwise, many courts may find ordinances like that of Coral Gables 
acceptable because, as Justice Thurgood Marshall was fond of saying, 
“[t]he Constitution does not prohibit legislatures from enacting stupid 
laws.”229 
 
 
229 New York State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 209 (2008) (Stevens, J., 
concurring). Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia wrote that “[p]arty conventions, with their attendant 
‘smoke-filled rooms’ and domination by party leaders, have long been an accepted manner of selecting 
party candidates . . . .  While a State may determine it is not desirable and replace it, it is not 
unconstitutional.”  Id. at 206-07 (upholding New York State’s byzantine system of allowing political-
party delegates to select judicial candidates). 
